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The Law of Harassment in the UK: 
A Growing Concern
Victoria Howes*
This article considers recent changes to legal provisions governing harassment at work, in particular sexual 
harassment, in the UK, in the light of EU Directive 2002/73/EC, and the remedies available in the 
courts and employment tribunals. This article then provides a statistical profi le of a total of 21,335 sex 
discrimination cases brought to nine employment tribunals in the UK between 2003 and 2008, high-
lighting the fact that the claims submitted by employees are successful in only a small percentage of cases, 
due to the fact that many cases are withdrawn or settled out of court, and the fact that many claimants 
do not have legal representation, whereas nearly all of the defendants have the benefi t of legal representa-
tion in hearings at the employment tribunal, enabling them to present their evidence in a more effective 
manner. This is particularly important in cases of this type, where witness credibility is crucial to successful 
outcomes, as highlighted by the cases cited by the author.
1.  Introduction
One of the objectives of the European Community Strategy for 2007 to 2012 on health 
and safety at work is to make progress toward the prevention of harassment in the 
workplace, which suggests that harassment at work remains a persistent and widespread 
problem.
There are a number of particular issues that relate to harassment at work: harassment 
can take a variety of forms, which can be subtle and disguised; there is no clear defi nition 
of harassment; workers can be fearful of bringing a complaint; the English law of harass-
ment is complicated; and it is diffi cult to establish a case. Claims regarding harassment at 
work are usually brought under existing anti-discrimination laws where, as part of a dis-
crimination claim,1 the claimant also claims that he/she has been harassed because of his/
her race, sex, disability, sexual orientation, religion or belief, or age. Although a special 
section on harassment was recently introduced in each piece of anti-discrimination legis-
lation to accommodate claims of harassment, these claims are often seen as discrimination 
claims. To some extent, this is because Employment Tribunals do not separate harassment 
claims from other cases, or indeed mention any such claims at the case allocation stage.
It must be noted that in recent years cases of harassment have been brought under 
other ‘available’ provisions, including the Protection from Harassment Act (PHA) 1997, 
* Senior Lecturer, Salford Law School, Salford University, UK.
1 For example, a sex discrimination claim.
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and employers’ breach of duties under tort of negligence and contract. However, these 
provisions are not as widely exercised as provisions under anti-discrimination laws.
This article will consider a number of problems relating to harassment claims 
brought under anti-discrimination laws. It will examine recent cases in the light of these 
problems and consider the diffi culties of claiming under existing laws from the position 
of a potential claimant.
2.  Diffi culties with Establishing Harassment
The meaning of harassment is the fi rst problem that a person subject to harassment is 
faced with. Each piece of legislation refers to it as a conduct, including an unwanted 
conduct2 or merely a course of conduct.3 Conduct is usually associated with a process, 
rather than a one-off incident. Under PHA 1997, it is even made clear that ‘a course of 
conduct’ must involve conduct on at least two occasions and that reference to harass-
ing a person includes alarming the person and causing him or her distress.4 In some 
exceptional situations, individual acts may amount to harassment under current anti-
discrimination legislation.5
Giving an initial defi nition of harassment is reasonably straightforward: it is unwel-
come and unwanted behaviour that has an adverse affect on an individual’s health, per-
sonality, and self-esteem. However, this defi nition is quite broad as there are many forms 
of behaviour that can fall into this category. Tina Stephens, for example, refers to various 
types of behaviour that can amount to harassment, which include violence, deliberately 
ignoring someone, jokes, offensive language, gossip, slander, sectarian songs, letters or 
rhymes, sarcasm, unfounded criticism, setting unattainable targets at work, posters, graf-
fi ti, obscene gestures, coercion for sexual favours, pestering, spying, and stalking.6 Some 
of these behaviours are easier to categorize as harassment than others. To some extent, 
this is because the same conduct and behaviour can be perceived differently by different 
people in a situation when it is not obvious that the conduct amounts to harassment 
from an objective point of view. For example, the same statement can be seen by one 
person as an innocent joke and by another person as an insulting comment. Should this 
statement then be considered from the point of view of a reasonable third party? On the 
one hand, the law says that what is important and what should be taken into account is 
the effect that such conduct has on a particular person, not on a person who can assess 
the situation objectively. Accordingly, the personal characteristics of a person should be 
taken into account. ‘It is the perception of the recipient which is important – that person 
2 Anti-discrimination legislation.
3 Protection from Harassment Act 1997.
4 Ibid., s. 7(3).
5 De Souza v. Automobile Association [1986] ICR 514, Bracebridge Engineering Ltd v. Darby [1990] IRLR 3, Insitu 
 Cleaning v. Heads [1995] IRLR.
6 T. Stephens, Bullying and Sexual Harassment (Institute of Personnel and Development, 1999), 3.
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defi nes what is offensive to them. Behaviour which one individual may regard as accept-
able may be unacceptable to another person.’7
On the other hand, the court has to assess the situation objectively and make judg-
ments on evidence presented by the parties. The credibility of often confl icting evidence 
and the court’s objectivity in assessing it are crucial in this process. A claim will very 
often fail when, based on the evidence, the court decides that the claimant’s perception 
of his or her treatment is wrong, despite the fact that the claimant genuinely believed 
that the treatment amounted to harassment (or indeed discrimination). In one such case, 
a tribunal ruled as follows:
We are of course not qualifi ed to reach a conclusion about the deep psychological motives of 
witnesses and parties who give evidence before us… It is perhaps unnecessary in our decision for 
us to state fi rmly whether the Claimant may have believed it in her own mind or that she has 
deliberately invented it. Whatever may be the fi nal truth on that issue, so far as our proceedings 
are concerned, we simply state the conclusion that the Applicant has not established that there 
were any facts which could raise even a prima facie case that (the Respondent) was guilty of 
sexual harassment.8
Harassment, especially if it occurs persistently over a long period of time, can have 
harmful and long-lasting effects on individuals. The signs and symptoms of these effects 
include fear, stress and ill-health, loss of confi dence, anxiety, and depression. Harassment 
at work can affect not only particular individuals but also the workplace as a whole. The 
effects are usually clear from poor performance, resignations, confl icts, poor morale, high 
labour turnover, accidents, and absenteeism.9
3.  Which Route to Take?
In general, the UK law relating to harassment at work cannot be found in one particular 
provision of either statutory or common law, and claimants have a diffi cult dilemma as 
to which legal route to take.
There is no common law tort of harassment, although rules of employer’s liability 
can apply when damage is suffered by the claimant as a direct consequence. Although 
anti-discrimination legislation now provides a specifi c protection from harassment, claims 
can only be brought when it is closely connected to a particular type of discrimination. 
There is also statutory protection available under PHA 1997. However, since the original 
nature of the Act was criminal and the purpose of it was to protect people from stalkers, 
it is rarely used in the workplace context.10
7 <www.lbp.police.uk/freedom-of-information/publications/HR/2%20Harassment.htm>, 20 Feb. 2008.
8 Cases 2301985/2004 and 2304227/2004, unreported, London South ET, para. 54.
9 Stephens, 2.
10 The only known harassment case decided under the PHA 1997 is Majrowski v. Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust 
[2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224.
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Clearly, the claimant should use the law and procedural rules that are the most 
relevant and applicable in his or her case, including the time limit, liability, defenses, and 
remedies.
The time limits allowed for bringing claims are different under different laws. Under 
anti-discrimination legislation, the claimant should bring a claim within three months of 
the date of the incident of harassment. However, since often there can be a continuing 
act of harassment, the advice is usually to fi le an ET1 form11 as early as possible. The 
tribunal may also extend the time limit if it sees that it was just and equitable to do so 
in the circumstances.12 In action under tort of negligence, the time limit is three years. 
It runs from the date of knowledge13 of the injury, which is the fi rst date the claimant 
became aware of the following facts:14 the injury was signifi cant; the injury was attribut-
able to the alleged harassment; the identity of the defendant. Finally, under PHA 1997, 
the claimant has six years starting from the date of the act complained of.
The issue of liability is also important to consider. For example, a comparison can 
be drawn between PHA 1997 and anti-discrimination legislation. This was discussed in 
Majrowski v. Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust.15 In general terms, both types of legisla-
tion prohibit harassment, albeit differently defi ned. As established under PHA 1997, the 
employer can be vicariously liable for the harassment committed by his employees ‘in 
the course of employment’ even when this is not foreseeable. This liability is strict. It was 
held by the House of Lords that ‘acts done by an employee in the course of his employ-
ment were to be treated as done by his employer, subject to the employer being able to 
show he had taken all reasonably practicable steps to prevent his employee doing such 
acts’,16 where acts refer to discrimination and/or harassment.
An advantage of PHA 1997 is that the victims do not need to show that harass-
ment was based on a particular ground, whether sex, race, sexual orientation, religion 
or belief. However, under PHA 1997 the claimant must show that the harassment17 by 
another employee committed in the course of employment was at the same level as the 
criminal offense.
There is a trend for claimants to bring actions under several provisions in one claim, 
for example, under the tort of negligence and PHA 1997, or under the tort of negli-
gence and breach of contractual duty, since all of them must be brought in civil courts. 
Claims for breaches of anti-discrimination provisions are usually brought together with 
claims for constructive dismissal in employment tribunals. The advantage of this method 
11 The ET1 form is an application form that must be completed by the applicant who brings a claim to the employ-
ment tribunal.
12 See, for example, s. 76 of SDA 1975.
13 Limitation Act 1980, s. 11(4).
14 Limitation Act 1980, s. 14(1).
15 [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224.
16 Ibid., paras 34 and 36, and s. 32 of the Race Relations Act 1976.
17 Note that only harassment that amounts to ‘a course of conduct’ rather than a one-off incident is prohibited 
under the PHA 1997.
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is that it is usually cheaper to bring a claim in the tribunal where legal representation is 
optional, rather than in the civil courts, where proceedings can be very expensive.
The case of Green v. DB Group Services (UK) Ltd18 is an example in which the 
claimant brought a claim under both tort of negligence and PHA 1997. The outcome 
of being successful under both heads of law meant that both provisions were taken into 
account in calculating damages.
Monetary awards are also an issue that the claimant should consider when bringing 
a claim. Under the tort of negligence, the person subject to harassment is entitled to 
damages, which include general damages for the injuries suffered, for example, depres-
sion, compensation for the degree of the increased vulnerability to future depression 
and pre-existing psychiatric vulnerability; and damages for past and future losses.19 The 
overall award in damages can be quite signifi cant.20
Under anti-discrimination legislation, a victim of harassment is entitled to be com-
pensated through a number of remedies. The amount of compensation is calculated on 
the same basis as damages in tort and includes injury to feelings, personal injury, and 
fi nancial loss. The most signifi cant here is the compensation for injury to feelings as the 
claimant can claim this irrespective of whether he has suffered any direct fi nancial loss. 
The size of this award depends on the particular case and takes into account the degree 
of hurt, distress, and humiliation caused.21 Similar calculation relating to injury to feel-
ings applies when the claimant leaves his/her employment as a result of harassment and 
claims constructive dismissal, so that the overall award under anti-discrimination legisla-
tion can be substantial and amount to hundreds of thousands of pounds.22
Under PHA 1997, awards of damages for anxiety are normally modest23 and it is 
assumed that the consequent fi nancial loss is not substantial either, as the person does not 
suffer an injury that would remove them from the market for a long time. Understand-
ably, such small awards may deter claimants from bringing claims under this Act.
4.  Harassment under UK Anti-Discrimination Laws
As already noted, the most common vehicle for bringing a claim of harassment is anti-
discrimination legislation.24 However, specifi c provisions relating to harassment within 
18 [2006] EWHC 1898 (QB).
19 Ibid., paras 177, 179, 181, 183, and 188.
20 In Smith v. Manchester Corp [1974] WLR 41295, the Court of Appeal held that the damages awarded for loss of 
future earnings should be substantial not notional.
21 Some guidance was provided in Vento v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police (No. 2) where the Court of Appeal 
set out three broad bands of compensation: the top band that applies to the most serious cases is GBP 15,000 to 25,000 
where the top fi gure should be awarded only in exceptional cases; the middle band that applies to serious cases that do not 
merit an award in the highest band is GBP 5,000 to 15,000; and the lower band that applies for less serious cases, such an 
isolated one-off incidents, is GBP 500 to 5,000.
22 <www.legalday.co.uk/lexnex/clo260603.htm>, 13 Mar. 2008. On 30 Jun. 2003, Kent Employment Tribunal 
awarded nearly GBP 180,000 to a trainee sales executive at a car showroom, who worked there for only a week before the 
conduct of a salesman forced her to leave.
23 Majrowski v. Guy’s and Thomas’s NHS, HL, para. 29.
24 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, Race Relations Act 1976, Disability Discrimination Act, and so forth.
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this legislation are quite new. They came into force in domestic legislation on 1 October 
2005 as a result of the implementation of Directive 2002/73/EC. Since then, all anti-
discrimination legislation in the UK has contained a special provision prohibiting harass-
ment. In all pieces of anti-discrimination legislation, harassment is defi ned as follows: a 
person harasses another person if he or she engages that person in unwanted conduct that 
has the purpose or effect of violating that person’s dignity, or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating, or offensive environment for that person and this conduct 
is based on one or a number of discriminatory grounds, namely on that person’s sex; race 
or ethnic or national origin; religion or belief; sexual orientation; age; or disability.25
In addition to this (common) defi nition, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 provides 
for a specifi c type of sexual harassment in section 4A(1)(b), which states that a person 
subjects a woman to harassment if ‘he engages her in any form of unwanted verbal, non-
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature that has the purpose or effect of violating 
her dignity, or of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment for her’.
Because of the novelty of anti-harassment provisions, it is not surprising that there 
are not many tribunal cases that refer directly to these provisions. The fact that the ET1 
form,26 which should be submitted by the claimant to the tribunal, does not include 
a section on harassment is also an indication of some lack of awareness or acceptance 
of these provisions. However, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) has been quite 
proactive in making sure that these provisions are properly exercised. In the recent case 
of Love v. Alexander Le Skerne Ltd,27 the EAT held that all the materials were there upon 
which the Employment Tribunal (ET) could have made a fi nding on the application of 
section 4A relating to sexual harassment if it had considered that statutory provision at 
all.28 Although the EAT acknowledged that the general rule that should be followed as 
laid down by J. Arnold in Kumchyk v. Derby City Council29 is that a party should not be 
allowed to depart from what her representative had decided to do, this did not apply to 
the present case because:
(a) the ET1 makes it clear that there is an allegation of sex discrimination. We note that there was 
no specifi c place on the form ET1 for an allegation of sexual harassment. The appropriate parts of 
the form simply refer to discrimination; … (c) the Employment Tribunal clearly thought that the 
allegations of sex discrimination was one of sexual harassment both in its fi ndings of fact and in 
its conclusion to which we have already referred.30
Therefore, even when it is not explicitly stated in the application form, the tribunals are 
required to apply statutory provisions relating to harassment if the material in front of 
them clearly indicates that the claimed discrimination is based on harassment.
25 SDA, s. 4A(1)(a); RRA, s. 3A(1); DDA, s. 3B(1); RB Regs, Reg 5(1); SO Regs, Reg 5(1); Age Regs, Reg 6(1).
26 The application form that is submitted by the complainant to the employment tribunal.
27 [2007] WL 1157971.
28 Ibid., para. 10.
29 [1978] ICR 116.
30 Ibid., paras 14 and 15.
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Unlike provisions relating to direct discrimination where the claimant has to show a 
comparator or, in other words, has to show that he or she was less favourably treated in 
comparison with another person who was of different sex, race, religion, and so on, the 
requirement for a comparator was removed from anti-harassment provisions. However, it 
was argued that it was indirectly reintroduced by the wording ‘on the grounds of ’ as the 
claimant has to show that the act was committed on the prohibited ground, for example, 
on the ground of sex.31
This issue was challenged in the High Court in Regina (Equal Opportunities Com-
mission) v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.32 The Equal Oppurtunities Commission 
(EOC) contended that the use of the words ‘on the grounds of her sex’ in section 4A(1)
(a) impermissibly introduced an issue of causation in the concept of harassment contrary 
to the Council Directive 76/207/EEC Article 2(2), which does not require or allow 
it. The Directive uses the words ‘an unwanted conduct related to the sex of a person’, 
which means it is associated with the sex of the person, rather than caused by it.33 It follows 
from here that ‘a complainant may be harassed by conduct which is directed at a man 
or another woman’.34 The wording ‘on the grounds of sex’ is ‘the appropriate defi nition 
for discrimination, where causation or ratiocination is required, but that harassment is 
distinct, and cannot be defi ned in the same way, dependent as it is simply on a connec-
tion or association with sex’.35
As a result, section 4A(1)(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act (SDA) 1975 was amended 
by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Amendment) Regulations 200836 and as from 6 April 
2008 the defi nition of harassment in SDA 1975 prohibits ‘unwanted conduct satisfying the 
statutory test which is “related to” the complainant’s sex or the sex of another person’.37
It was also accepted in this case that if section 4A incorrectly defi nes the concept 
of harassment in the sphere of sex, then the equivalent provisions of the other discrimi-
nation statutes or regulations38 are also unlawfully formulated as not implementing the 
relevant Directives.39
However, no changes have been made to the definition of harassment in other 
areas of anti-discrimination legislation. Thus, if the employment tribunal was not 
satisfied that harassment took place on grounds of race, religion or belief, sexual 
31 L. Clarke, ‘Harassment, Sexual Harassment, and the Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination)’, Industrial Law 
Journal 35, no. 2 (2006) 161-178.
32 [2007] EWHC 483 HC.
33 Ibid., para. 3.
34 Ibid., para. 3.
35 Ibid., para. 6.
36 SI 2008/963.
37 C. Pigott, ‘Equal but Different’, New Law Journal 158, no. 7323 (2008): 766.
38 Section 3A of the Race Relations Act 1976 (as inserted by Regulation 5 of the Race Relations Act 1976 
(Amendment) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1626)), s. 3B of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (as inserted by Regula-
tions 3(1) and 4(2) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1673)), Regulation 
5 of the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1660), and Regulation 5 of the Employ-
ment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1661).
39 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 Jun.e. 2000 (on the implementation of the principle of equal  treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin; OJ 2000 L180, 22) and Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 
27 Nov. 2000 (establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation; OJ 2000 L303, 16).
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 orientation, or age, for example, the claim would fail. In the recent case of English v. 
Thomas Sanderson Blinds Ltd,40 the Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of the Employ-
ment Appeal Tribunal, considered a potential confl ict between the UK and EU relevant 
provisions in relation to sexual orientation and the majority held that the UK provi-
sions41 did not need to be ‘read down in order to conform to the Directive’.42 In relation 
to the word ‘grounds’, L.J. Sedley noted that the court has to merely answer the question 
‘why did the other employees harass the claimant?’ and ‘it is not necessary to demand a 
logician’s or a  lawyer’s answer by looking for motive or purpose or cause and effect. If 
the harassment was based on his sexual orientation, whether real or imagined, the ques-
tion ‘Why?’ is answered’.43 Accordingly, the Court found ‘a way of reading the defi nition 
of sexual orientation harassment in line with the Framework Directive’.44
A Single Equality Act,45 which aims to harmonize anti-discrimination laws, does 
not address this issue. However, it may still be argued that the legislation will need to 
be changed.
4.1.  Burden of proof
As in all civil litigation cases, the applicant, who purported to be discriminated against or 
harassed, had the burden of proof of establishing and proving that the act of discrimina-
tion or harassment took place on the prohibited ground. Undoubtedly, that was a heavy 
burden to bear, as the applicant, for example in the case of direct discrimination, had 
to establish that he or she was treated less favourably in comparison with others, fi nd a 
correct comparator in order to prove that he or she was particularly disadvantaged, and 
show a personal detriment as a result of this treatment.
Relatively recently, the burden of proof in claims for unlawful discrimination and 
harassment has been reversed in anti-discrimination legislation by virtue of a number of 
sets of amending regulations (the fi rst being changed in 2001).46 For example, section 
54A(2) of the Race Relations Act 1995 states that:
where, on the hearing of the complaint, the complainant proves facts from which the tribu-
nal could, apart from this section, conclude in the absence of an adequate explanation that the 
respondent (a) has committed such an act of discrimination or harassment against the complain-
ant…the tribunal shall uphold the complaint unless the respondent proves that he did not commit 
or, as the case may be, is not to be treated as having committed, that act.
40 [2008] EWCA Civ 1421.
41 Regulation 5 of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003.
42 Directive 2000/78/EC (Framework Directive).
43 [2008] EWCA Civ 1421 per L.J. Sedley, para. 41.
44 Pigott, 766.
45 The Single Equality Act Green Paper, which was published in Jun. 2007, launched the consultation, a summary of 
which is at <www.communities.gov.uk/documents/corporate/doc/322984.doc>.
46 For example, SDA 1975, s. 63A (inserted by SI 2001/2660, Reg. 5), RRA 1996, s. 54A (inserted by SI 2003/1626, 
Reg. 41).
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As a result, the claimant has to establish a prima facie case of harassment for a tribunal to 
see that the unlawful act has been committed on a prohibited ground and then it is for 
the employer to prove that the treatment ‘was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of 
sex’,47 race, disability, and so forth, in relation to the common defi nition of harassment. 
It is a norm for employment tribunals to refer to guidelines on this point, which were 
fi rst formulated in Barton v. Henderson Investec [2003] IRLR 332 and later modifi ed by 
the Court of Appeal in Igen v. Wong [2005] IRLR 258. In the latter case, the Court of 
Appeal held as follows:
(i) Section 54A of the RRA and section 63A of the SDA require that the Tribunal go through a 
two-stage process;
(ii) the burden is on the Claimant at the fi rst stage to prove facts from which the Tribunal could, 
apart from this section, conclude in the absence of an adequate explanation that the Respondent 
has committed, or is to be treated as having committed, the unlawful act of discrimination;
(iii) if the complainant is able to discharge that prima facie case then at the second stage the 
Respondent is required to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he did not commit or is not 
to be treated as having committed the unlawful act;
(iv)  whereas generally the Respondent’s explanation is a matter to be considered at the sec-
ond stage, it is possible that the facts as found by the Tribunal to be relevant may also take into 
account the explanation given by the Respondent rather than relying solely on the evidence of or 
on behalf of the Claimant;
(v) only if the second stage is reached and only then if the Respondent’s explanation is inadequate 
will the Tribunal conclude that the Claimant has been discriminated against.
It is not suffi cient to prove facts from which the tribunal could conclude that the respondent 
‘could have committed’ such an act. It is not suffi cient for the complainant to prove only the pos-
sibility rather than the probability of those facts at the fi rst stage.48
It is clear from the Court of Appeal’s guidelines and the statutory language itself that the 
onus is on the claimant to prove the factual premise of each of his or her allegations and that 
if he or she is unable to do so, then the burden of proof does not shift to the respondent.
However, despite the changes in the law, two trends are emerging in practice. First, 
it is still quite a diffi cult task for the claimant to establish the case, and second, it takes 
some time for tribunals to adjust to and implement the changes.
4.2.  Law in practice
In order to have an overview of how the law is applied in practice, it was decided to 
look at cases of sex discrimination that have been brought to nine tribunals in differ-
ent parts of the UK, namely, in Birmingham, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, Manchester, 
London Central, London South, Sheffi eld, and Bristol, since 2003. Many of these cases 
47 See Clarke and Igen Ltd v. Wong [2005] EWCA 142, CA, Guideline 11.
48 Igen Ltd v. Wong [2005] EWCA 142, CA.
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included claims of harassment, which were either based on applicants’ sex, or seen to be 
of sexual nature.
This research explored how cases of harassment have been handled by tribunals in 
practice. The fi rst thing that has become apparent is that cases are allocated to broad cat-
egories, such as ‘discrimination on grounds of sex and marital status’, ‘discrimination on 
grounds of race or religion or belief ’, and so forth. There is no specifi c category relating 
to harassment. However, often claims of harassment are brought together with claims 
of discrimination, for example, sex discrimination or race discrimination. It is therefore 
quite a laborious task to locate claims of harassment from among the thousands of cases 
of discrimination brought to tribunals on an annual basis.
Second, as with any qualitative research, the data provided by tribunals are not 
always clear, accurate, or suffi cient to make absolutely certain conclusions and some 
margin of error should be taken into account. However, as long as the margin of error 
does not exceed 10%, it is generally accepted by legal practice that a result (or a valua-
tion) is accurate.49
With these considerations in mind, it appears that there have been a total of 21,335 
sex discrimination cases brought to nine tribunals since 200350 with the following 
 breakdown:
Birmingham Bristol Leeds Leicester
Liver-
pool
London 
Central
London 
South Manchester Sheffi eld
2,697 1,103 3,50751 844 1,297 2,539 3,494 5,044 810
As in other civil cases, decisions in cases of harassment, or indeed all discrimination 
cases, depend on evidence presented by an applicant and a respondent. Needless to say, 
in most cases evidence is confl icting. In the majority of such cases, the tribunal has to 
decide whose evidence is more trustworthy and which witness, including parties to a 
claim, is more credible. The following examples typify the way a tribunal approaches 
such a decision:
the Tribunal had no hesitation in preferring the Respondent’s evidence in its entirety. The 
Respondent’s witnesses were, without exception, credible and their evidence was at all times con-
sistent with the documentation. The same cannot be said of the Claimant. Where there was any 
dispute of fact, the Tribunal preferred the evidence of the Respondent.52
In another case the tribunal said:
49 A permissible margin of error is normally 10% either side of a notional ‘right’ fi gure, but it can be extended 
to 15% either way, or a little more, in exceptional circumstances: Singer & Friedlander Ltd v. John D Wood & Co [1977] 
2 EGLR 84, 85 per J. Watkins.
50 These data were collected in Aug. 2008.
51 Note: at the time of the preparation of this paper, only 701 out of 3,507 were considered by the author.
52 Case 2300553/2006, unreported, London South ET.
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we found at the conclusion of our deliberations that on the very serious allegations which the 
Claimant made about the early state of her employment revolving around the allegations of sexual 
harassment and indeed on this virtually fi nal example of her very confrontational attitude and 
behaviour in the last few days of her employment, the Claimant’s evidence was totally unbeliev-
able and unreliable.53
It is hardly surprising therefore that very often the claimant does not pass the fi rst 
hurdle of establishing the case of harassment (or discrimination) before the burden can 
be shifted on the defendant.
It was found out that up to 17% of all sex discrimination claims that went to nine 
UK tribunals since 2003 were struck out.
Struck Out Cases
Birmingham Bristol Leeds Leicester
Liver-
pool
London 
Central
London 
South Manchester Sheffi eld
356 146 590 72 141 85 527 651 13
13% 13% 17% 8.5% 11% 3% 15% 13% 2%
On average, 13% of sex discrimination claims were struck out by seven out of nine tri-
bunals with the exception of London Central and Sheffi eld, where these numbers were 
exceptionally low.
The reasons for claims being struck out include, inter alia, the following: claims 
have not been actively pursued, or the claimant failed to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination/harassment.
The number of withdrawn cases is quite high, varying from 22% to 46% and on 
average 34.6% of sex discrimination claims were withdrawn from the nine tribunals.
Withdrawals
Birmingham Bristol Leeds Leicester
Liver-
pool
London 
Central
London 
South Manchester Sheffi eld
959 288 156 308 486 771 1,140 2,260 372
35.5% 26% 22% 36.5% 37.5% 30.4% 33% 45% 46%
There is a slightly smaller number of cases that are settled either with the help of 
ACAS54 or privately, often on the day of the hearing. The range of settled cases varies 
between 20% and 36.5% as illustrated below.
53 Cases 2301985/2004 and 2304227/2004, unreported, London South ET, para. 78.
54 ACAS – Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service.
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Settlements
Birmingham Bristol Leeds Leicester
Liver-
pool
London 
Central
London 
South Manchester Sheffi eld
844 396 213 309 442 701 837 998 183
31% 36% 30% 36.5% 34% 28% 24% 20% 22.5%
It can therefore be seen that the vast majority of cases were withdrawn or settled. The 
reasons for withdrawal are hard to ascertain but may include, for example, claimants’ 
feelings of discouragement, private settlements, or realization by the claimant that the 
claim does not have a good chance of success because of the lack of evidence. Taking 
into account that, unlike most defendants, in many cases claimants cannot afford to have 
legal representation, it is not surprising that they get cold feet and choose to surrender 
before even trying.
Ultimately, only a small number of cases were actually heard by tribunals varying 
from 5% to 13% of total applications. Of these a similar proportion of cases decided for 
either claimants or defendants, although in some tribunals the number of cases decided 
in favour of defendants is higher.
Proportion of Cases Decided for Claimants (C) and Defendants (D)
Birmingham Bristol Leeds Leicester
Liver-
pool
London 
Central
London 
South Manchester Sheffi eld
C 96 56 35 44 67 122 174 109 39
3.5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 2% 5%
D 136 80 33 43 77 185 274 134 41
5% 7% 5% 5% 6% 7% 8% 3% 5%
A sample of around 200 cases of direct sex discrimination was closely inspected for the 
purpose of the study. It was found that an issue of harassment was raised in fi fty-eight of 
these cases either as part of section 1(2)(a) relating to direct sex discrimination, or under 
section 4A relating to the new anti-harassment provision of the SDA 1975.
It was noted that in the majority of cases, fi fty-six out of fi fty-eight, the  defendants 
were represented, usually by lawyers, whereas in quite a large proportion of cases, 
 twenty-three out of fi fty-eight, the claimants had no representation. Out of the twenty-
three cases where claimants had appeared in person, in only eight cases the tribunal 
decided in favour of claimants in their claims of direct sex discrimination and/or harass-
ment, whereas fi fteen remaining claims were dismissed. It is worth noting that out of the 
above eight cases, the defendants had lay representation in fi ve cases, no representation 
in two cases, and legal representation in only one case.
The ratio of successful claims where claimants had representation was quite  different. 
Here, the number of successes and dismissals was almost equal. Out of thirty-fi ve cases, 
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claimants were successful in seventeen. It can be argued that the outcome of cases was 
affected depending on whether there was some representation in the case. However, in 
order to make such an inference for certain, it is necessary to consider each case and its 
particular facts and evidence. 
4.3.  Use of evidence
As noted earlier the evidence often depended on the credibility of the parties and the 
tribunal had to decide whose evidence to trust. Some tribunal conclusions illustrated 
the diffi culties here:
We have found this a disturbing case. The Claimant has cynically manufactured a case based on 
egregious lies. She has shown a conspicuous disregard, indeed contempt, for the truth. As for the 
Respondents, we were staggered by the standards which Mr M. and his management colleagues 
appeared to regard as unexceptionable… We have looked in vain for any evidence of a desire 
on the part of the Respondents’ decision-makers to set standards of decency and mutual respect 
within the organisation.55
It would not be surprising therefore that the tribunal could fi nd it diffi cult sometimes 
to decide whose evidence is more trustworthy and credible.
However, it is not acceptable if the tribunal cannot make up its mind as to whose 
evidence to trust as in the case of alleged sexual harassment in Reedman v. Athithan.56 The 
case was brought before the changes to the legislation in 2005 and so the tribunal had 
to rely on the principles established in Reed & Bull Information Systems Ltd v. Stedman,57 
namely whether the respondent had shown a sexual interest in the claimant, which she 
had made clear was unwelcome and which she found offensive, which was overwhelm-
ingly a question of fact.58 The tribunal stated that they were ‘unable to say that we [were] 
satisfi ed on the balance of probability with [Miss Reedman’s] evidence’.59 The EAT was 
not impressed by this and held:
The fact that the issue which the Tribunal had to decide was predominantly one of fact did not 
absolve the Tribunal from its obligation to explain how it had arrived at its conclusion. Where 
there is a confl ict of evidence, it is necessary to explain ‘why one version has been preferred to 
another’; see Tchoula v Netto Foodstores Ltd, 6 March 1998, cited in Anya v University of Oxford 
[2001] ICR 847 at [24]. Having said that ‘it may be enough to say that… one manifestly had a 
clearer recollection of the material facts or the other gave answers which demonstrated that his 
recollection could not be relied upon’; see English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2003] IRLR 
710 at [19]. If, as here, the Tribunal was unable to decide whose evidence was to be preferred, the 
Tribunal had to explain why it had not been persuaded that Miss Reedman’s version of events 
was true. The critical question is whether the Tribunal did that.60
55 Case 2302548/2004, London South.
56 [2007] WL 504745.
57 [1999] IRLR 299.
58 Ibid., para. 11.
59 Ibid., para. 12.
60 Ibid., para. 14.
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The claimant, who has to establish the prima facie case, has to provide enough evidence to 
persuade the tribunal that the act of harassment took place. This is a diffi cult task especially 
in cases of sexual harassment or harassment on the grounds of the claimant’s sex. For ex-
ample, in the case of Morris v. Health Zone Ltd,61 the employment tribunal concluded:
In this case the Tribunal was faced with considerable confl ict of evidence about the allegations 
of sex harassment by the Claimant. We were troubled by the lack of any corroborating evidence 
before us of the incidents alleged, when in this case, unusually, some of the incidents were said to 
have been witnessed and capable of verifi cation.
Although some corroborating evidence could easily be obtainable, such as video foot-
age, as it was in this case, some evidence often requires the claimant to provide names of 
other witnesses. This is quite diffi cult to do in court because of a fear that by incriminat-
ing (often former) colleagues the claimant may put them in a delicate position, which 
can potentially lead to victimization.
In a different case:
the Tribunal accepted the Claimant’s evidence that she had not told a single person about the 
alleged sexual harassment by Mr X.62 It was put to her that the reason why she did not tell 
anybody about these incidents was because they had not occurred and she had fabricated them. 
The Claimant denied that suggestion and told the Tribunal that she had not spoken to anybody 
about the incidents because she was extremely embarrassed about them, and because she was ter-
rifi ed about what Mr X might do if he became aware of her allegations of sexual harassment. ‘We 
accept that it is often extremely diffi cult for women who are the victims of sexual harassment to 
tell others about their experience, and to complain about it. However, we do not fi nd this to be 
a convincing explanation for the Claimant’s silence…We did not fi nd it credible that she would 
shrink from making a complaint of sexual harassment’. The Claimant did not provide any satisfac-
tory explanation about why after her months of silence she decided to make her complaint.63
Although there is no doubt that on evidence presented to the tribunals the cases are 
correctly decided, there are still questions of whether the claimants are required to satisfy 
unreasonably high demands, such as that the claimant should claim harassment as soon as 
it occurs, that she should use the right terms, in particular, sexual harassment instead of 
mere harassment, and fi nally she should support her claim with corroborating evidence, 
which is usually in the form of witness statements given by named individuals, often 
former colleagues. Although in theory the burden of proof is reversed, it does not seem 
that this makes any signifi cant difference in practice.
5.  Conclusion
It is clear that there are still many problems with the UK law relating to harassment at 
work. In addition to the practical diffi culties that victims of harassment have to deal with, 
they have a number of hurdles presented by the current state of the law.
61 Case 2300468/2006, unreported.
62 The name is not stated for reasons of data protection.
63 2301657/2004 and 2304101/2004, unreported.
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First, a decision is needed as to which legal provisions to use and therefore 
which court to consider. Under current legal options, claimants tend to rely on anti-
 discrimination legislation and apply to employment tribunals. However, since 2003 only 
a small proportion of all applications, up to 13%, reached full tribunal hearings, whereas 
the majority of cases were either withdrawn by claimants, up to 46%, or settled, up to 
36.5%.
Second, there is still a problem with the defi nition of harassment under anti-
 discrimination legislation. As stated in the case of Regina (Equal Opportunities Commission) v. 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,64 the comparator should be removed from the 
provisions relating to harassment as it was already done in SDA 1975.
Third, although the burden of proof was reversed in anti-discrimination laws, it 
is still diffi cult for the applicant to establish the so-called prima facie case after which 
the burden can be shifted to the defendant. The success of every case of harassment 
will depend on evidence, which is almost always confl icting, and the claimant can fi nd 
it diffi cult to support her claim with corroborating evidence. In the majority of cases, 
applicants, unlike defendants, cannot afford legal representation to help them to present 
evidence in the best possible way. The short time allowed for bringing a claim under 
anti-discrimination laws is also a deterrent factor. It requires certain skills to be able to 
draft proper particulars of a claim, which can be supported by evidence. The high costs 
of bringing claims and insubstantial monetary compensation may also bar claimants from 
court proceedings.
In summary, it is evident that victims of harassment are still being put in quite a dif-
fi cult position. In addition to being harassed, emotionally weakened, and most probably 
frightened, they have to face the ambiguities and complexities of the law and evidence. 
Positive trends have, however, started to emerge, as tribunals have become more familiar 
with anti-harassment provisions and use them with more confi dence, making decisions 
that provide solid groundwork for future cases.
64 [2007] EWHC 483 HC.
